Limit the impact of security compromises with systemd security directives : linux
I feel lots of the options systemd offers might definitely be carried out underneath different init software program and/or service managers. However, I feel one of the key variations between the varied tasks although is many of the others (like runit and SysV init) are against implementing this stuff in init or the service supervisor straight.
Other init tasks are inclined to wish to concentrate on simply offering init, or offering a primary service supervisor, whereas permitting different instruments (one other layer) to deal with most of the issues systemd implements natively.
For instance, you’ll be able to simpler have SysV begin a program that masses and executes systemd items, and implements sandboxing, and so forth. But SysV does not do it straight. It leaves that as much as one other layer so init does not get slowed down with lots of further code and options not everybody desires.